There are some topics which are so hot-button that any criticism, even speculative and limited, can read as complete dismissal. So it is with my Is Social Software Bad for the Dean campaign? piece of Monday. The thing that put me over the edge was seeing that piece linked to with the phrase “the backlash against the idea of digital campaigning has begun.”
This is of course nothing like my actual position, so to set the record straight, here are four things I’d like to stipulate, as the lawyers say:
1. Social software generally, and online tools for political action specifically, have incredible promise
2. Howard Dean’s campaign has made the most compelling and original use of those tools ever
3. The use of those tools is transforming American politics generally
Fundraising has been turned upside down. All three top Iowa finishers use MeetUp. The President of the United States of America has a blog. This is all good, and we have the Dean campaign, and especially Trippi, Rosen, and Teachout, to thank for much of it.
4. Dean lost, badly, twice, in states where he had huge leads
Over at David’s new blog I read, in the comments “The success of the Dean Campaign has been the coming together of message, delivery, and people at a historical point in time.”
I agree with this, which is why it is so puzzling to me that this kind of success (cultural transformation) has not translated into actual success (votes). A number of people reacting to the earlier piece have posted testimonials to hard-working Dean supporters out there campaigning in the cold, but of course none of that explains anything. The Kerry campaign has idealistic young people working for it too, and it wasn’t any warmer when the Edwards people were ringing doorbells.
To explain Dean’s losses relative to his earlier lead (25% ahead in NH two weeks ago), you have to look at characteristics peculiar to the Dean campaign, and of course the most salient characteristic is the style of engagement, including the use of social software.
I won’t re-state the original piece here, but if I was working for an organization that wanted my guy to be the Democratic nominee, I’d be working overtime trying to figure out the disconnect between numbers 1-3 and number 4 above.
I suspect they’re related, though I may of course be wrong in this speculation (something that also usually goes without saying in less partisan environments.) At most they are merely orthagonal — Marc Hedlund, Adam Greenfield, and Rusty Foster have all posted interesting versions of this thesis in various comments.
However, the thesis that the campaign’s use of online tools is working out just fine seems to me to be untenable after Iowa. Dean is losing where he was expected to win, and any analysis that doesn’t start with that conundrum seems dangerously close to “Take the credit but not the blame.”
Update: Mitch Ratcliffe has a great post likening the Iowa and NH defeats to
developers faced with the choice between taking user feedback or not:
Here’s a crazy thought: Could the widespread discussion of the Dean campaign’s current challenges produce a retooling of its software (both the code and the ideas in people’s heads) fast enough to yield an astonishing turnaround that out-turnarounds John Kerry? Not if Dean and camp are defensive about the critiques and refuse to internalize them. If it is true that no corporation can access all the intelligence in the world if it is closed off from the world, it is certainly true that a campaign that sees criticism of its strategy as an attack on the candidate will grow dumber by the minute.
Could the Dean campaign turn on a dime, like Microsoft reacting to the Web browser or Roosevelt’s America, which quadrupled production capacity of planes and ships to win World War II?
Read the whole thing.
1. Dave Douglas on January 28, 2004 8:20 PM writes...
I think focussing in on the disconnect between 1-3 and 4 is important to do. Two hypotheses:
1. I think alot of people were drawn to the Dean the Campaign as much as Dean the Candidate, but when it came time to really vote, the attachment to the Campaign wasn't sticky enough to keep people on board when others had real momentum for the first time. (this sounds vague, but I believe there's a real issue here)
2. The effects of 1-3 may be very real, but the fraction of the population that they reach or represent is still very low. Even the fundraising, while dramatic, still represents a tiny fraction of the populus and is only a starting point to a solid base on which to win the nomination (it's also not unrealistic to give $100 to a campaign you like, but that $100 may not be enough to keep you from switching if so inclined). I believe the intertwined community amplified by an interested media makes it feel like 1-3 are touching more Americans directly than it really is (yet).
Permalink to Comment2. Lucas on January 28, 2004 10:52 PM writes...
I hate to say it, but you walked into this beartrap. The media often use candidates as proxies for open referenda on various issues. For Dean these were anger and "prickliness". It is not suprising that Internet activism is being made into a third.
Permalink to Comment3. Adina Levin on January 28, 2004 11:03 PM writes...
Dean's campaign is like a dot-com that sold lots of goods, and then flubbed deliveries and returns.
The failure of dot-coms didn't prove that the internet was bad for business -- just that a clicks and mortar strategy is needed for success.
Permalink to Comment4. Alex on January 29, 2004 5:46 AM writes...
You know, Clay, I think it's not an unfair characterization of your piece. I mean, we've met and talked - you seem like a good guy - I'd be upset if you thought I wasn't being fair.
So, is this:
http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/000356.html
really off-base?
I think the fact that you've clarified your position is a sign that it wasn't totally off-base.
Or am I wrong?
Permalink to Comment5. Clay Shirky on January 29, 2004 12:06 PM writes...
Alex, I was posting emotionally, having put a lot into social software generally, so don't take it amiss. Your characterization seems overbroad, as I noted that Kerry and Edwards and Clark are using these tools as well.
The problem, I think, is not with the tools per se, no matter what their context, but rather with Dean's use of them. The use of digital tools to energize voters is a good idea, which is why I think its vital that Dean's use of them didn't translate into the expected results.
Permalink to Comment6. Richard Bennett on January 29, 2004 7:50 PM writes...
Seems to me that the nasty response from the Deaniacs to your piece proves its correctness. The mechanical means of recruiting volunteers are most appealing to the fanatical subset of potential volunteers, and the presence of sufficient numbers of such people in a campaign gives the whole enterprise a fanatic bent. Dean's Internet outreach didn't captivate mainstream people, it only reached disaffected, angry neophytes who were more interested in sending a message than in electing a candidate.
And they're still pissed at Dean for making their software look bad by losing, not for any political outcome. Basically, Deaniacs are loons.
Permalink to Comment7. Jon Lebkowsky on January 29, 2004 9:04 PM writes...
Clay, based on what I've heard (including comments from people who went to Ohio), I have an idea what happened here. The social software worked where it could be most effective, in building initial support, attracting volunteers and raising funds for the campaign. However in campaigning for the primaries in Iowa and New Hampshire, Dean's organization on the ground was critical, and it was not working as effectively as the software strategies had been. Kerry's people were smarter strategically, and Trippi made significant mistakes (negative ads, a "storm" of strangers rather than a focus on locals, focusing on Gephardt while Kerry was building support).
Software support for political participation is so promising, it did concern me that the subject of your earlier post could lead to FUD and undermine our attempts to evolve software tools that that take us closer to democracy by building participation and engagement. I know that wasn't your intention.
Permalink to Comment8. Jon Lebkowsky on January 29, 2004 9:31 PM writes...
Oh, heh. That's Iowa, not Ohio.
Permalink to Comment9. David Weinberger on January 30, 2004 1:23 PM writes...
Clay, you've put forward an hypothesis (driven home by your vivid comparison to stoners rocking out to Twisted Sister, damn you for writing well), that the Deanies' use of social software made the supporters complacent. How would you suggest we evaluate your hypothesis?
Meanwhile, I have my own hypothesis about what went wrong in Iowa and NH: The ads sucked, the Iowa volunteers were badly trained, and the vast majority of people didn't like Dean and the horse he rode in on.
Permalink to Comment10. Clay Shirky on January 30, 2004 3:16 PM writes...
David, that's a fair question (and it was fair when you aked it on Loose Democracy as well.) Send you email on this subject, but it didn't arrive before this, so I'll repeat it here: I'm waiting til after the next round of primaries to expand on my earlier points, because I'm more interested in the use of social software than in the Dean run, and because once Dean has moved far enough away from Iowa and NH, in whatever direction, we'll be in a better position to discuss his use of net-politics tools vis-à-vis his early campaign.
Until then, which is to say until I can write about the campaign without risking dorky "Iowa wasn't a loss!!!" posts showing up in the comments, I'm not going to say another word about -Howard Dean-.
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