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Here we'll explore the various economic and financial principles that impact the business of technology, keeping up to date on the various ideas, theories, trends and numbers, dispelling the silly buzzwords, slogans and fads and generally trying to understand how recent developments affect this industry going forward and may help divine what's going on and where things may be headed. Among the topics we'll touch on: regulatory issues, intellectual property, network effects, the general economy, productivity and more.

About this editor


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Arnold Kling has a Ph.D. in economics from MIT; founded homefair.com, one of the very first commercial websites, in 1994; separated from Homefair in January 2000 after it was sold to Homestore; is author of Under the Radar: Starting Your Internet Business without Venture Capital



and is an essayist. Please send any comments, as well as suggestions for what we might point to from this page, to us at econ@corante.com


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THE BOTTOM LINE: the economics of IT

By Arnold Kling


Posted Wednesday, July 24, 2002

Vacation until August 1

I'll be on vacation for a week.  Posting will resume August 1st or shortly thereafter.


. . . . . .


Posted Tuesday, July 23, 2002

The U.S. and Japan

I think it is fair to raise the question of whether the aftermath of the U.S. stock market bubble will resemble the past dozen years in Japan.

Still, ignoring the lesson of Japan is a bad idea, thinks Ron Napier, the head of Napier Investment Advisors. Salomon Brothers' chief Asian economist in the 1980s, Napier is reminded how many times he was pooh-poohed in the late 1990s for saying that the U.S. stock market was just as much of a bubble as Japan's was. Thinking that the aftermath couldn't be as bad is similarly wrongheaded.

If you had polled economists and business leaders a dozen years ago about Japan, not one of them would have predicted the long economic slump that transpired.  As with any economic depression, explanations are very difficult.

In his Richard Ely address, freshwater economist Edward C. Prescott argues that Japan's depression is characterized by massive inefficiency.  (Freshwater economists, from universities near the Great Lakes, tend to view macroeconomics somewhat differently from saltwater economists, from universities near the Boston or San Francisco bays.  Krugman and DeLong are saltwater economists.  I come from the saltwater tradition myself.)

Prescott says that if you are in a depression, it is either because your workers are under-employed (as in France), your capital stock is low (Mexico in the 1980's), or productivity is low (Japan today).   Of Japan, he says,

The problem was the country-specific productivity factor, which fell 17 percent in the 10-year period from 1991 to 2000.

I think that this is a fundamental difference between the U.S. and Japan.  Our companies are not going to hang onto workers at the cost of efficiency.  If we take a hit, it will be because new jobs fail to absorb laid off workers, so that employment falls off. 

However, I think that we can avoid a long period of high unemployment.  The workers who are being laid off from WorldCom or Arthur Andersen have broadly-applicable skills and flexible opportunities.  They are not members of the auto workers' union, who think of themselves as only being employed if they are assembling cars.   

I think that there are plenty of ways that the stock market crash will adversely affect spending in the economy--universities will have to slow their building boom, state and local governments will be strapped without capital gains tax collections, and so on.  But I think that the economy will survive.


. . . . . .


Posted Saturday, July 20, 2002

Post-Bubble Fundamentals

The press reports that the U.S. stock indexes are back where they were in 1998.  However, the size of the economy, as measured by current-dollar GDP, is about 20 percent higher, so in a sense the stock indexes are 20 percent below 1998 levels.  Relative to GDP, stock indexes are closer to where they were in early 1996.  The bubble is over.

Fundamentally, the good news about the economy includes this:

  1. U.S. banks are sound.  There is no sign of a collapse of liquidity or the money supply.
  2. World trade is expanding.  There is no Smoot-Hawley tariff on the horizon.
  3. People are transitioning out of jobs in declining firms and into other jobs, with less employment rigidity than plagues Japan and Europe.
  4. The cumulative effects of Moore's Law on productivity growth are very likely to keep the natural rate of unemployment low. 
  5. Congress caved into the Bush Administration on tax cuts, and the Administration has caved into Congress on spending.   Long term, this fiscal irresponsibility is worrisome, but short term it is good macroeconomic medicine.

Overall, looking at the post-bubble fundamentals, I like the outlook for stocks.  The market is not cheap, the way it was in 1981.  But it is not overpriced anymore.

 


. . . . . .


Posted Friday, July 19, 2002

When Congress Meddles

As Congress closes the barn door on the latest round of corporate scandals, Daniel Gross points out how the current non-transparent executive pay was stimulated by the barn-door closing of a decade ago.

In the early 1990s, angered by coincident downsizings and reports of large executive payouts, Congress ended the deductibility of executive salaries above $1 million...

But the measure excluded from the $1 million limit items that the Internal Revenue Service deems to be incentive-based or performance-based. As a result, the ban encouraged companies to funnel executive compensation into these murky areas, which are far more difficult for investors and the public to understand, and which are prone to abuse.

Thanks to 'Mindles H. Dreck' for the pointer.


. . . . . .

A Blog Format for CEO's

Stop, Start, Continue

On July 18, I went to the first event of Blogmeetup in my area. Not feeling young or single enough for the D.C. location, I went to Rockville, where Dave Gammel was the only other attendee. Dave had some fascinating tidbits about the boomlet in organizational blogs, and this led me to think about what will happen when CEO's start to blog.

The challenge for CEO's will be to avoid on the one hand being too impersonal, bland, and corporate-speakish while on the other hand not being too aggressive and domineering. One compromise would be to strike the tone of Winston Churchill's messages to commanders ("pray do something about....pray find a way to..."). Another compromise would be to give specific, individual feedback in Stop, Start, Continue format. What follows is a sample of this sort of feedback, for a couple of my fellow bloggers.

For Brad DeLong

Continue to post frequently. Continue to provide timely review and comment on economic concepts, such as Okun's Law. Continue to link to interesting working papers by economists. Continue to spice your posts with wit and interesting charts. Continue to respond to comments. Stop quoting entire articles. Use links, instead--this is the Web,after all. And linking puts you at less risk for being accused of copyright infringement.

For Megan McArdle

Continue to explain economic reasoning, such as the case for abolishing the corporate income tax. Continue to offer a distinctive style that is sharp-witted but warm-hearted. Start to consider putting some of your longer essays in a separate format, or better yet, finding someone to pay to publish them.


. . . . . .


Posted Thursday, July 18, 2002

It's Corporate Governance, II

In addition to Brad on my left, Virginia on my right also views corporate governance as the key to reducing accounting fraud.  She points out how Congressional barn-door-closing could make things worse.  Then she suggests,

If the shareowners themselves don't have an interest in truthful financial reporting, who guards the corporate guardians?

One possibility is the stock exchange. While artificially high earnings may help a company, accurate results serve the market as a whole. An exchange that independently monitored its listed companies' results would benefit from investor confidence at the expense of laxer competitors.

Her thinking is that current shareholders may benefit from inflated accounting, so they will not police the firm's accounting practices effectively.  Therefore, the auditors need to be chosen by someone other than the firm.


. . . . . .


Posted Wednesday, July 17, 2002

Don't Bet on Phone Companies

I argue that Moore's Law is working against them.


. . . . . .

Blame McKinsey

Malcolm Gladwell has a long, fascinating article on the role played by McKinsey at Enron and in misguided corporate practices in general. 

Nobody, not even the consultants who were paid to think about the Enron culture, seemed worried that those fifty holes might disrupt the functioning of the affected departments, that stability in a firm's existing businesses might be a good thing, that the self-fulfillment of Enron's star employees might possibly be in conflict with the best interests of the firm as a whole.

These are the sort of concerns that management consultants ought to raise. But Enron's management consultant was McKinsey, and McKinsey was as much a prisoner of the talent myth as its clients were. In 1998, Enron hired ten Wharton M.B.A.s; that same year, McKinsey hired forty. In 1999, Enron hired twelve from Wharton; McKinsey hired sixty-one.

Because McKinsey hires so many people from business school, it never receives any critical examination from the business school community.  Only an independent journalist can spotlight its flaws. 

I would add that I hold McKinsey partly responsible for the Internet Bubble.  As I reported as early as August of 1998, McKinsey's core strategic advice, which is that market share matters more than profits, was the basis of most bubble companies.  The ranks of dotcoms were strewn with ex-McKinsey personnel. 

Gladwell also discusses the problem of charismatic, narcissistic executives.  This reminded me of a passage from a column by Hal Varian.

Psychologists find that men tend to suffer from "self-serving attribution bias." In plain language: men tend to think their successes are a result of their own skill, rather than dumb luck, and so become overconfident.

The processes by which large companies select CEO's and by which venture capitalists select entrepreneurs are skewed in favor of "self-regarding attribution bias," a trait that is hardly admirable.  Fans of Apple's Steven Jobs used to speak admiringly of his "reality distortion field."  If your criteria for a CEO is someone with a powerful "reality distortion field," you get what you ask for. 

The Narcissist Nineties have ended badly.  The capitalists who hire CEO's need to view "self-regarding attribution bias" as a negative trait, not a positive one.  And it's high time that McKinsey's role in some of the worst excesses is brought to light.


. . . . . .


Posted Tuesday, July 16, 2002

It's Corporate Governance, Stupid

Brad DeLong has some good thoughts on the problem of corporate governance.

The American system has not worked badly compared to those of other countries--at least, has not worked badly until the past five years or so. Then key pieces of the system have failed--one of them being the accountants who, as Michael Kinsley has said, decided that it was no fun to be the designated driver at a national orgy of financial drunkenness. The question is what to do now to make our system better. Alan Murray seems to think that Blackstone head Pete Peterson has a good idea: use large institutional investors to perform the managerial surveillance and supervision role

There are two ways that we can respond to recent corporate scandals.  One is to assign Congress the role of closing the barn door after every horse that escapes.  The other is to change corporate governance to include better oversight by shareholders.  In my opinion, only the latter approach is constructive.


. . . . . .

A Wireless Coalition Sure to Fail

When it comes to building a wireless network, this coalition is sure to fail.  It includeds Verizon and Cingular, two companies that are most threatened by wireless.  Here is the crucial point, which is buried in the story.

It is not intended to supply broadband connections to customers' homes, an executive involved in the discussions said.

In other words, the idea is to build a wireless infrastructure only where it will not compete with existing business models for phone companies.  Sorry, folks, that is not how the economy works.  You need to design services to meet customer needs, not to protect legacy businesses.


. . . . . .


Posted Monday, July 15, 2002

Go, Zimran!

A couple of great recent posts on Winterspeak.  On Palladium,

1) Palladium does not stop viruses. Microsoft is not going to veto code executing on your computer. A virus is code executing on your computer, so this will have no effect. 2) Palladium will not protect privacy. Yes, PGP tokens get exchanged, not form information, but this really doesn't matter -- privacy in the sense people care about the concept (are people reading my email? why do I keep getting spammed?) has nothing to do with Palladium. 3) Palladium is about DRM. Signed content is DRM content, and only that will care whether Palladium is there or not. This will support the content cartels...

On musicians and money,

Unfortunately, economic justice guarantees that the lot of the artist will always be difficult, as many people want to do it and one unknown artist is interchangable with another. With the laws of supply and demand being what they are, what is offered by many and valued by few will clear at a low price.

This is a point I made at more length in Equilibrium in the Market for Rock'n'Roll.

 


. . . . . .

Stock Options:  Non-transparency as a Feature

A paper by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker makes some key points about stock option compensation.  They ask why more firms do not use indexed options, which reward executives for relative performance and take out the effects of general increases in stock prices for the market or for a sector.  They point out that indexed options, unlike the options that are typical today, would have to be expensed under current accounting rules.  Thus, managers choose non-indexed options because of

the desire to keep option compensation more camouflaged.  Suppose that, as some have claimed, the market is more likely to notice the cost of managers' options when they appear as charges against earnings rather than in the footnotes of their financial statements...

Indeed, this fear of exposure may explain managers' fierce resistance to the FASB's attempt to rationalize options accounting.  Financially, there is no plausible justification for the disparate treatment of conventional and indexed or performance-conditioned options.

It is sometimes claimed that the cost of stock options is too difficult to calculate.  However, indexed options are even more complicated to calculate, and FASB already treats these as expenses. 

I think that Bebchuk, et al, are spot on in their analysis of the role of executive stock options in established, public corporations.  They are a tool by which executives extract wealth from shareholders, using non-transparent accounting as camouflage.  The lack of transparency is a feature, not a bug, from the executives' point of view.

With all that said, it is not clear to me that the government needs to get involved in the specifics of accounting treatment.  Shareholders ought to be able to take care of themselves, by insisting on clear accounting.  If they cannot do so, then this is a corporate governance problem, and the public policy issue is to improve the ability of shareholders to control corporations.


. . . . . .


Posted Friday, July 12, 2002

The PocoMail solution

After reading my article asking Microsoft to build a usable email spam filter, a reader said that I should check out PocoMail.  I paid for it ($25, you can try it for free first if you like), and it is even better than what I asked for.

Here is what makes it usable, in my opinion.  In Netscape, I manually set up a filter to classify as junk email anything that comes in without my email address in the "to" field (this is a sign of something being sent to a list).  Well, that rule filtered out some email lists that I want to get, so I had to go back and program higher-priority rules to allow those lists.  That kind of manual editing of filters is time-consuming, and it leads you not to use filters.

PocoMail has its own rules for sorting stuff into junk mail, which work better than my rules.  But it also started out by putting mail from lists that I want into the junk folder.  But it was a one-click process to "unblock" a sender, just as it's a one-click process to block a spam sender. Because the filtering process is more usable, I feel like I have more control over spam with PocoMail than with other email programs.


. . . . . .


Posted Thursday, July 11, 2002

The Case for Spectrum Deregulation

Following a link from David Reed, I found this easy-to-understand argument by Timothy Shepard.  He asks us to imagine that we asked thousands of electrical engineers to independently design walkie-talkie systems for thousands of people that would work in an area the size of a football stadium.

50 years ago, very few, or perhaps none would succeed.  25 years ago, some would succeed.  Today, most would succeed, perhaps all of them.

The point is that computing power can be used to get around what we used to call the problem of "interference" in radio signals.

 

 


. . . . . .


Posted Wednesday, July 10, 2002

Trust This!

John Udell wrote a popular column on how people would not need Microsoft's scary Palladium technology if they would use authenticated email.  In my reply, called  Consumer to Microsoft: Trust This!, I say that

I would sooner give the Evil Empire my first-born child than go through all that rigamarole to try to use authenticated email

But I do propose an alternative.

UPDATE:  Lincoln Stein's latest column describes the type of spam filtering I talk about.  It's a very clear discussion, but I think he's too pessimistic.


. . . . . .


Posted Tuesday, July 9, 2002

Newspapers Want to be Beggars

In my latest TechCentralStation column, I question the long-term financial viability of newspapers.

On a cohort basis, newspaper readership among young adults has fallen by over 50 percent in fifteen years...In an industry that depends on economies of scale to overcome high fixed costs, a decline in volume that approaches 50 percent is going to be fatal. These demographic effects will slowly but inexorably kill the newspaper business.

I suggest that the ultimate destiny for newspapers that survive is to be supported by philanthropists.


. . . . . .

Information Wants to be Free

The case for keeping professors' research trapped inside expensive academic journals grows weaker every day.  Thanks to the indispensable Brad DeLong, I found my way to this article about creating a 'super archive.'

Proponents ... imagine a day when every research university gives its research away through the Web, allowing scholars and nonacademics to mine it for ideas and information.

Create the archives, and with bloggers like Brad sifting through for interesting material, and we do not need the journals at all.


. . . . . .

Bush, Harken, WorldCom, etc.

Blogger Tleeves writes to ask my opinion on the Bush 1990 Harken stock sale story.  Well, to a first approximation, the economic consequences of Harken and Bush's sale of same are...nil

Take WorldCom.  They are on the verge of bankruptcy.  Had they not committed accounting fraud, my best guess is that today they would be...on the verge of bankruptcy.

In fact, I'll venture to speculate that if you add up all of the accounting problems in all of corporate America since MicroStrategy helped turn around the Internet Bubble Monitor in March of 2000, the restatements change the aggregate stock market price/earnings ratio by an amount that could be dismissed as rounding error.

This chart is what has economic consequences.  It vividly illustrates the spectacular, unsustainable increase in stock prices of the last decade.


. . . . . .


Posted Thursday, July 4, 2002

Security and Censorship

John Gilmore coined the aphorism, "The Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it."  Today, Hal Varian may have come up with a new one.

At the level of bits, censorship and digital-rights management are technologically identical.

His column is about new products that have embedded chips that keep track of how the products are used.  He raises a concern that user-driven innovation could be stifled by this sort of technology.


. . . . . .


Posted Tuesday, July 2, 2002

Extreme Command-Line Bigot

Dan Lyke speculates that the graphical user interface is the root of corporate scandals.

If, as Edward Tufte asserts, "power corrupts, PowerPoint corrupts absolutely", how much of the billions bilked by executives at Enron, GlobalCrossing, WorldCom, Xerox, and who knows what else were enabled by GUIs?

I liked the Tufte quote, and I Googled it to try to find an elaboration of his issues with PowerPoint.  All I found was another aphorism, which is that paper is a high-resolution medium and PowerPoint is a low-resolution medium.  That reinforces what I always felt, which is that reading a 2-page memo was more efficient than sitting through a half hour of a corporate presentation.  If I were the CEO of a Dilbert-sector company, I would ban corporate presentations and encourge blogging instead. 

But I think that Dan is stretching things a bit to blame corporate scandals on the GUI.  It is probably true that the corporate scandals would not have happened had the graphical user interface not been invented, limiting the use of computers to people who deal with command lines, but that means throwing out the baby of progress along with the bathwater of Enron.  If you want to go that far, other phenomena that helped enable the corporate scandals would include the Internet, the emancipation of women, and flush toilets. 


. . . . . .


Posted Monday, July 1, 2002

Palladium

Thanks to Doc Searls for a pointer to this interview about Microsoft Palladium with Microsoft's Mario Juarez.  In the comment section that follows the interview, editor Phil Becker gets very passionate about his belief that somebody needs to build an infrastructure for identity on the Internet.  Some of the readers get equally passionate that they do not want Microsoft to be the major player in that process.

I feel as though I lack complete information on this topic, either because Palladium is vaporware or I lack technical know-how, or both.  But as I understand it, Palladium is supposed to create conditions under which I can "trust" the information that comes to me from some other person or machine.  The anti-Softies are worried that "trust" will be dependent on "uses Windows™."  If it does, then they argue, correctly, that the Evil Empire will have a chokehold on the Internet.

But what if it turns out that the use of Windows is only a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition, for gaining access to the network of trust or whatever you want to call it that Palladium fosters?  I think that there are some Privacy Luddites out there who still would be against anything that undermines the anonymity of the Net.

Also, I think that there are programmers out there who--although not openly--want to maintain an environment in which it is possible to break into computer systems.  They feel instinctively that they will be more powerful in such a world than in a world in which break-ins become impossible. 

So, I think that there will be at least two camps opposed to Palladium.  One camp wants security, but does not want Microsoft to be a dominant player in it.  Another camp does not want to see anything at all happen that dramatically reduces the vulnerability of computer networks.


. . . . . .









Copyright 2002-2003 Arnold Kling. All rights reserved. Terms of use


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